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THE STATE AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
By NIEMON OHBUCHI 
I 
The law of a community binds， as a general rule， the will of 
those who perform volitional activities as the constituents of the 
community. The law， however， may bind the will of those who are 
not the constituents of the community when necessary from the 
legal point of view. By “the legal point of view" here is meant 
the point of view from witbin tbe law itself， and tbe above-mentioned 
necessity arises to ensure tbe mutual life among tbe constituents 
of tbe community. And tbe “constituents of tbe community" mean 
tbe buman factor of tbe community stipulated as sucb by tbe law 
of the community witb tbeir qualifications all prescribed by tbe 
law of tbe community. Tbe law binds， as a rule， the will of tbe 
wi1l-exercising bodies ttat are stipulated by tbe law as tbe con咽
stituents of tbe community. Now， tbe community of nations exists 
where a number of states maintain sucb volitional relations among 
themselves as are necessary for tbeir existence. In tbis kind of 
community， tberefore， itis evident that states are， as a general 
rule， tbe constituents of tbe cmmunity wben viewed from tbe 
standpoint of tbe law deriving from tbe wi1 of states， i.e. tbe 
international law. That is why states are said to be tbe legal 
constituents of tbe community of nations， and tbe international law 
binds， as a rule， the will of eacb state in international relationsl). 
Tbis， bowever， does not mean tbat what tbe international law 
directly binds are con五nedto states. It also binds the will of 
those wil1-exercising bodies wbicb are not states. In this case， tbe 
international law， in binding tbe wi1 of tbose otber tban states， 
is after al binding tbe wi1 of states. In otber words， itis recog-
nized as law among tbe states carrying on international relations 
that a certain international law binds the wi1-exercising bodies 
1) Oppenheim's International Law， Vol. 1， 3rd Ed.， 4th Ed.， 5th Ed. 
q 
b 
other than states. 
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In tbis sense， the international law does not necessarily bind 
tbe wi1 of states aIone， but it does bind the wiI1 of states五rstof 
al， since it regards states as the constituents of the community 
of nations. This is not a mere theory but is attested by the reality 
of international reIations. Thus the international law prescribes 
the qua1ifications of a state， stipulates its capacities， provides the 
acquisitiol1 and lapse of its 1'ights and obIigations， and legaI1y 
l'egulntes its reIations with other states. Here lies the direct bearing 
of the internationaI law upon the state. This connection between 
the international Iaw and the state arises from the necessity of the 
state in maintaining its reIations with other states. Because of 
this necessity tbe stateis wi1ing Iy bound by the internationaI 
Iaw. 
As has already been stated， the international law stipulates 
how a state comes into being as such within the meaning of the 
internationaI law. According to the existing international Iaw， the 
substance of the relative stip1.1ations may be classi五edinto tbree: 
(1) that an organization caIIed a state does exist， (2) that tbis 
state is capable of enjoying tbe international community Iife and 
(3) what is cal1ed the recognition of state has been given to this 
state. A new state just founded， tberefore， isnot a state within 
the meaning of tbe internationaI law unless it satis五esthe three 
requirements mentioned above. 
The stipulation of the existing internationaI law to the e旺ect
that a state should satisfy the above-mentioned three requirements 
betore it becomes a state within the meaning of the internationaI 
law or tbe subject of the internationaI Iaw， isbased on the fact 
that the international law is the norm of the wi1l or actions of 
states when they carry on their mutuaI relations. The state is an 
organization and no organization can exist without a norm， especi-
aIly a juristic norm. A state exists because the people who con-
stitute the state are bound by the juristiC norm that allows the 
existence of the state. The existence of a state here， however， 
concerns its people alone anddoes not in itself apply to other 
peoples. But these other peoples， too， constitute their respective 
states by their own laws of constitution. Therefore， there are no 
normative relations between one state and another， which means 
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there are apparently no actual or social relations. When， however， 
wil1-ex;ercising bodies enter into mutual relations， it becomes 
necessary for them to restrain their Wi1l mutual1y and through these 
restraints arise the normative or legal relations. Tberefore， norm-
ative relations must wait for social relation~1 tbe two taking place 
simultaneously. Tbe mere existence of more tban two states does 
not necessari1y leud to thei:r social relaqons.; Before tbat， tbose 
statesmust recognize euch other as. wil1吃xercisingbodies. 
‘Tbis mutual recognitlo:q must be made ty the wi1 of respective 
states， wbicb means tbat tbe ，will of eacb state is bound by such 
mutual recognition. Tbus the mutual recognition becomes the law 
between the states concerned. When tbese states carry on social 
relutions with other states eyer expanding the circle unti1 al tbese 
relations are conceived as one community， the law of recognizing 
eachotber becomes tbe law. conce:rning ，the qualifications of the 
constituent of tbis community. 
When tbe law stipulating that states mus七bemutually recog-
nized before tbey can be states in their mutual relations has come 
to exist in the community of nations， and if a new state just 
founded enters into relations， tbrough the procedure of mutual 
recognition， with .the st~~e戸 which are already the constituents of 
the internationaI community， the existing. law concerning the 
qua1ifications of the state naturally app1ies to the relations between 
tbe new and tbe old states. Therefore， in today's community of 
nations， a newly・foundedstate is considered to gain its full status 
in tbe light of the international law wben tbe new state and the 
old constituents of tbe international community come. to take some 
mutual actions a$ states. 
The above interpretation of tbe international law. concerning 
tbe establishment or recognition of state wi1l settle many contro-
versial issues centering around the recognition of state; for instance， 
so-called ConstituUve Tbeory vs. Declarative Theory concerning 
the e丘ectof the recognil.ion of state; the controversy upon the 
legal status of a state wbich bas not yet been recognized; whether 
the recognition of state is a unilateral legal act or bilateral， etc. 
According to this interpretation， the Dec1aration Theory loses its 
ground. Seen from the standpoint of tbe international law， a 
newly-founded state is not 'a state within the meaning of the in 
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ternational Iaw until itis given recognition2). But， apart from the 
internationaI law， the new state is of course a state. 1n this case， 
a state is not immediately a staLe within tJ:e meaning of the in-
ternational Iaw. Then， a state which has not yet been recognized， 
is not a state within the meaning of the international law， but it 
is certainly a state from other poinLs ofview and can legalIy be 
a state when recognized ty other statesin futu1'e. As to whether 
the recognition of state ls a unilateral Iegal act 01' bi1ateraI，it 
must be understood that the recognition is neither a uniIateraI 
legal act nor a bilateral one， fo1' it is a factual act given effect 
by tbe internationaI law3). Al1. legal acts， whetber unilateral 01' 
bilateral， must be the acts of those who are tl:e subjects of law. 
羽Thenone of the parties is not the subject of law， there can be 
no legal act. A state is not the subject of the international law 
before it becomes a state within the meaning of the international 
law by obtaining the required qualifications. Therefore， no act 
between an unrecognized state and the constituents of the intern-
ationaI community is a legal act. 
r 
When a certain number uf. people found a state‘in o1'der to 
lead a group life and this state comes to possess the quali五cations
stipulated by the international Iaw so that it can establish IegaI 
relations with other states. the state is said， in the Iight of the 
international la w. to have acquired “capacity of enjoyment of rights" 
(Rechtsfahigkeit; hereafter called “passive legal capacity") and 
“capacity to perform IegaI acts" (狂andlungsfahigkeit;hereafter 
caI1ed “active legaI capacity"). The state that bas tbusacquired 
these capacities is an organization whose constituting members 
bave already begun their group ‘life. Therefore， the state as an 
organization already possesses an organized will. When the intern-
ationallaw gives passive and active Iegal capacities to a state， it
2) Opposite views incIudεKunz， Die Anerkennung der Staaten. im VoJkerrecht; 
Kelsen， Das Problem der Souveranitat; Verdross， Die Verfassung der VむJkerre-
chtsgemeinschaft. 
3) SchoJars who regard the recognition as a bilateral act include: Verdross， Die 
. Verfassung， S.127; Anzilotti， Lehrbuch des VむIkerrechts，S. 119岨120.
Scholars who regard the recognition as a unil司teraIact include: Franz Ptluger， 
Die Einseitigen. Rechtsgesch註fteim Volkerrecht， 1936， S.133-167; 
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does not create the wi1I of the state; the international law can 
not do that. It only. gives a certain legal effect， under certain 
conditions， to an organizalion which already exists as a will-
exercising body. 
The passive and active legal capacities in the international 
law are di妊erentfrom those. in the. civil law in that the former 
aregiven by the intern&tjop&l law to a st;ate on the premise that 
it 'is . already fl will-exen;:ißlp~body or a f!orripetent being capable 
of carrying OIi social 'uctivitles.. The legql capacities in 、thecivi1 
law concern the legal relations in civil life， and are. similar to 
those in the international law in that they both concern the legal 
relations in community life， but the civi1 law provides五rstof al 
passive legal capacity of a n批uralperson giving him the capacity 
to enjoy civil rights， and then stipulates the active legal capacity 
or the capacity to perform Iegal actsu:pon; maturity to a certain 
degree of the faculty: of volition. This is; probably because the 
subjects of the civiI law are natural personswhose faculty of 
voIition grows to maturity bydegrees，. and there can be legal rel. 
ations petween mature. persons and immature persons which must 
also be regulated.'Therefore;、thecivillaw provides a legal means 
to supplement the faculty' of .volitionof such incompetent persons 
as minors andother whose、facultyof volition is defective: the 
provision for the legal' representative. On the other. hand， • the 
passive and active legal capacities in the int.ernational law are of . 
the state which is considered fullycapable' of exercising its will， 
and there is no need forsupplementing the will輔exercisingcapacity 
of a state. Therefore， there is 00 institution of legal representative 
in the present community of nations. Any state recognized as 
such in the international Iaw. acquires both passive and active 
Iegal capacities simultaneously with. its foundation unlike the case 
of natural persons. 
As is evident from' the above considerations; the establishment 
of a state according to the international law means that the new 
state comes to possess both passive' and active legal capacities. 
In reality， the active legal capacity ・ofastate is expressed iIi its 
diplomatic' relations with other states. By H diplomatic relations" 
here is meant the relations of a state with other states according 
to the international law. Therefore， totnaintain diplomatic relations 
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is a proof tbat the state is a possessor of active legal capacity. 
1n tbe international law， such a state is said to have diplomatic 
competency or to be a diplomatical1y competent state. 
1n the international law， the state is a possessor of diplomatic 
competency. Therefore， the moment it loses itsc1iplomatic ，com-
petency， iti13 no longer a state within the p'ieaning， of the intern-
ational law. But whether such a state is sti1l an organization 
cal1ed a stnte as a place of group life for its people， has nothing 
1.0 c10 witlJ thc international， law. Even though the diplomatic 
cumpeLcncy aecording to the international law has been lost， there 
stiIl can exist an organization called a stat~. 
As has already been stated， the requirement for a new state 
ip acquiring the diplomatic competency is the recognition of the 
state. A newstate does not become a possessor of diplomatic 
competency or active legal capacity as well as passiye legal capa-
city according to the international law until it obtains recognition. 
From this point of view of the passive and active legal capacities 
also， the Declarative Theory can not be吟upheldas a theory of the 
existing interriational law. To il1ustrate further， the Declarative 
Theory regards any new state as a possessor ，of passive legal 
capacity immediately it is founded1). And yet， such a state does 
not possess diplomatic competency unti1 the competency is clarified 
by recognition. Thus， according to the Declarative Theory， the 
passive legal capacity of a state is first recognized and then the 
active legal capacity. This is nothing bu七aproof. that the theory 
neglects the fact that a state is an organization complete In its 
faculty of volition-a fact in the eye of the inLernational law. 
As a general rule， juridical person in a national law comes 
to lose its active legal capacity in accordarice with the norm of 
its internal consLitution， that is， the artic1es of associatiop or 
endowment. 1n other words， when a juridical person becomes 
unable to exist as a social being or will幽exercisingbody according 
to its articles of association orendowment， the juridical person 
loses its active legal capacity and ceases to exist In the light of 
the private law concerned. Likewise， a state exists as a will-
exercising body by virtue of its national hlW stipulating its internal 
1) Cf. Bluntchli， Das moderne Vむlkerrecht，1878; Brierly， The Law of Nations， 1936; 
Kelsen， Das Problem der Souveranitat， 1928. 
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structure， especially， the Constitution. By its Constitution， 
a state exists as a social being with faculty of volition. It 
follows then that when a state ceases to be a will-exercising body， 
it also ceases to be a social. being.. capable. of . exercising its 
will. The international law::regulating international relations can 
not neglect. this. fact.lniother words， when a state ceases 
to be a wil1-exercising bodyaccording to its Constitution， italso 
ceases to exist in the ligbt of tbe international law. This occurs 
when the Constitution on which a state is founded is removed 
by a social force different ・fromthat wbich is maintaining the 
Constitution. The existing Constitution is upheld by the common 
will of a group of people: who wish to maintain the state by that 
Constitution; But when the wil1 of another group of people di百erent
from or against that of the former group comes to prevai1 and 
entirely neglects the existing Constitutioll， the present state must 
lose its normative ground and ceasesto exist. 1n further detail， 
when the present Constitution is nul1ified by a common will di-
妊erentfrom the existing one， the state founded upon the present 
Constitution loses its qualifications as a state， and if a new Con-
stitution is established by a!.new group-wil1， the new state thus 
founded is not the same with the old one : but an entirely new state. 
The former state， with its Constitution nullified， not only loses its 
qualifications as a state i but also ceases to bea will-exercising 
body as an organization. This is a natural conclusion from the 
fact that a state is an organization based on the norm upheld by 
tbe people wbo constitute it. .1n otherwo1'ds， a state exists with 
the norm 01' law of constitution. and . perishes with the same law. 
The international law can not neglect this point; when a. state 
perishes in the way mentioned above， italso loses both active and 
passive legal capacitiesaccording to the international law. 
These considerations apply. to the cbanges of Governments by 
revolution. Here the following objection maybe raised: Since a 
state consi位sof the people， the territoryand the national. system 
or sovereignty， itmaintains its identity， even if the national system 
has changed， as long as the people and the territory are the same. 
But the people and the territory can be regarded as the elements 
of a state only because a group of people established an organiz-
ation called a state by a Constitutiop， w 
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their common wi1l， upon a .certain area asthe place of their group 
life. vVithout this Constitution there .can be no people nor territory 
as the elements of a stateマ. Therefore， after the old national system 
has been destroyed by a revolution， the state can not be considered 
to maintain its identity even if some laws， for in$tance， laws con姻
cerning civi1 life， are stil observed among.the people. : Originally， 
civil relations can exist without. Clny: national system; therefore， 
laws conccrning them can exist gpart from the national system. 
It is because tbe people admit， in the Constitution， the state 
inLervention in their. civi1 life that the civi1 code， commerical code 
and other. private laws are enacted by the state. . Therefore， the 
continued observance of the same private laws after a revolution 
can not .serve as a proof of the identity of the new and old states. 
As is stated above， the state whose Constitution has been 
nulli五edby a revolution loses its qualifications as a wil1-exercising 
body. The intennational law cannot neglect this point， .since it is 
the law among the sta:tes with the above-mentioned characteristics. 
When a state ceases to exist from the standpoint of its Constitution， 
it ceases to exist in the 1ight of the international law as welI. 
According to theories of the international law in the past， when 
a new Government is establisbed upon the samepeople and the 
same territory after a revolution， the .new state is considered 
identical with the old from the viewpoint of the international law， 
and al theinternational rights and obIigations of the former state 
are taken over by the new Government or state. But， inthis case， 
the newly-formed Government can not perform international legal 
acts unti1 it is recognized by the Governments of other states as 
being capable of performing such acts. This is wbat is called the 
rec;ognition of Government2). 
Those who be1ieve in the H recognition of Government" dist守
inguish the establishment of. a new state. from that of a new 
Government and maintain that in. the latter case the state continues 
to exist as a state. But， as long as the state i号 anorganization， 
it is only by the internal law constituting the organization that 
we can decide whether it continues to exist or Iiot. This is evident 
2) Scholars who distinguish the recognition of state from that of Governrnent include : 
Kelsen， Das Problem der SOl¥veranit註t，1928; Verdross， Die Verfassung der 
Vδlkerrechtsgerneinschaft， 1926.‘ 
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from the observation not only of the international relations but also 
of tbe social relations witbin a state， for instance， tbe establisnment， 
reorganization and dissolution of a corporation. Accρrdig to tbe 
view upbolding the recognition of Government，a newly・estabIisbed
Government cun not immediately represent tbe state and perform 
legal acts， internationally.. 'unti1 it is， l'O :recognized， by'. other 
Governments. Iil the meantime， sueh' a st:ate is a holder of passive 
legal capacity butcan not perfQrm legal a~!ts internationally. Then 
how wil1 it assert its r.lgbts. and otligations during this interval? 
If there were tbe institut~on Qf legq.l representative in tbe intern-
ational community， tbe question could te easi1y settled. As it is， 
¥it is entirely of no use to 'recognize only the passive legal capacity 
of the state during the time between the establisbment. of a new 
Government and its recognition3). At the same time， tbis reveals 
tbe fundamental relationship between the state and the international 
law; tbe international law does not alter in any way tbe essential 
nature of tbe state， since it. exists. out of the necessity to regulate 
tberelations between states. 
III 
Tbestate which carries on its international community life is 
an organization constituted bya certain' group of people for their 
group life upon a certain territory. Therefore， itis recognized by 
the people that tbe state can intervene in al the relation between 
the constituting memhers. This means tbat the organized wilI of 
the state， inintervening inthe people's community life， surpasses 
tbe wi1l of each individual and that ot each organization within tbe 
state; in otber' words， each citizen or each organization withiri the 
state sbould obey'the will ωthe state in the above-mentioned 
relations. 1n this sense， the state is the supreme being internally， 
and tbe other states with which it maintains social relations are 
also of the same character.: . Thus， the states carry on their mutual 
relations as possessors of supreme wil1 or supreme will-exercising 
bodies. 
The international law has its basis on the 'necessity for states 
3) Prof. Ryoichi Taoka: Kokusaihogaku Taiko (Out1ine of Internationa! !aw) 
i Revised & En!arged， Vo!. 1. 
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witb tbe above-mentioned cba1'acte1'istic to maintain mutua1 1'e1-
ations. Tberefo1'e， from its own .point of view， tbe internationa1 
law can not neglect， 01' ratber， must legalIy guarantee tbis cbar-
acte1'istic of states. Viewed from tbe standpoint of states， itmay 
be said that tbey can not maintain thei1' 1'elations unless mutualIy 
recognized as supreme will-exercising bodies. Because tbe internal 
relations 01' internal constitution of a1 the states must be of equal 
qua1ity bcfore they can maintain mutual relations. In this respect， 
tho re[atiol1s bctween states are diffe1'ent from those between a 
state and an o1'ganization in another state or between a state and 
a natu1'al pe1'son who is a constituent of anothe1' state. This can 
be ascribed to the cha1'acte1' of the state as the place of group life 
of its people， the cha1'acte1' which no other will-exe1'cising body can 
possess. The1'efo1'e， mutual recognition of the above-mentioned 
character of the state must take place before one state ente1's into 
relations with other states. 耳erea1'ises tbe necessity of establisbing 
a legal norm concerning sucb mutual recognition. Once such a 
law bas been estab1ished， each state can assert its status guaranteed 
by the 1aw in dealing with otber states. Seen frC>m tbe standpoint 
of eacb state assel:ting its stc.tus， sucb an assertion can be con-
sidered a legal rigbt of tbe state; and from the viewpoint of the 
international law， -itcan be said that the internationa1 law gives 
such a rigbt to the state. 
The p1'eceding paragrapb concerns tbe mutua1 recognition of 
the internal constitution of states when they establish relations 
between them. Since the internal constitution of a state is based 
on tbe fact that a certain number of people wisb to lead a group 
life within the state， the people who constitute the state， from their 
own point of view， are considered not to wish to establish any 
larger五eldof group Iife beyond the state. This means that each 
relationship between one state and another is individual， and no 
universal field of life embracing a1 the states of the world can 
possibly be reaIized. Tberefo1'e， states will not constitute any uni-
versal field of life and wi1l not be regulated by the wi1l of sucb 
universal o1'ganization. There are occasions， bowever， when several 
states form a certain organization in orde1' to attain a certain 
common. aim and estabIish somespecial relations among themselves， 
but sucb special relat 
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maintain tbem and do I10t apply universally. 前oreover，• such 
relations， even tbo.lJgb establisbed among al tbe states of tbe world， 
being special or speci五c，no state is bound by tbe organization in 
otber kinds of relations. In sbort， tbe cOmmunity of nations today 
is not a cOmmunity like a state. Tberefore， tbere can be no legal 
relations between tbe state and the international community itself. 
Tbus， al tbe international relations in tbe community of nations 
are. mutual relations betwe~n. states， and tbe 、internationallaw 
stipulates sucb :relation払 Tbis~omes from the cbaracter of the 
state mentioned above， and the international law guarantees tbis 
cbaracter as it is. In other wqrds， tbe international law legal1y 
estabIishes the status of the state with the above-mentioned char-
acter， and tbe state tbus acquires its legal status and can assert 
it against otber states. In asserting sucQ status， tbe state enjoys 
various rigbts guaranteed by tbe international law. 
The state enjoys th~ above-:p1entioned r~gbts according to the 
law tbat guarantees tbe character Qf. a .sta.te as against other states 
・orthe social status of a state， and tbese rights may safely be said 
the most importa.nt. f¥.nd . the' most fundamenta1. In other words， 
the state can carry on its international community life by virtue 
of these rigQts， Which in this sense can、besaid the basis of the 
international cOmmunity life. . That is why rights of this kind are 
generally called the. fundamental .rights. of tそestate1). By these 
rights， states maintain mutual.relations， and through these relations 
are estab1ished various internationaI .1aws. Therefore， the above-
mentioned rights can be called the primary rights in the international 
law2¥ 
Of the fundamental rights of the state in the international Iaw， 
the most frequently. citeCl are:. right of in'dependence， right of .in-
tercourse， right tq mutual ，:t;'espect， righ~ of self咽presevation，right 
of equal~ty， etc. As to their kinds and meanings， there are slight 
differences according to scholars，as the relative stipulations remain 
unwritten， but tbe differences areafter al1 negligible. The right 
of independence is tbe rigbt by wbicb a state can handle its internal 
~nd external a妊airsaccording' to its own will unless otherwise 
1) VatteI， Le droit des gens ou principle de la Ioi naturelle， 1758， Liv. 1， Chap. II; 
Oppenheim's International Law， Vol. 1; Martens， Volkerrecht， 1， 1880. 
2).' Cf. Verdross， Volkerrecht， 1937， though this author takes a different stand. 
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stipulated by the international law; the right of intercourse is the 
right by wbich a state is entitled to bold intercourse with other 
states; tbe rigbt to mutual respect is the rigbt by which a state 
is to be respected as such by other states， and the rigbt of se1f. 
preservation is the right by wbich a state ，can defend itself against 
aggression by otber states. Al1 tbese rigbts guarantee tbe fact thilt 
the state i8 a place for group life of a certain people. 1n the first 
place， the ri[r，!Jt of independence， by whicb a state can handle its 
intcrnal affairs unless placec1 in some special relations with otber 
stutes， is a proof tbat the national life， is complete in itse1f and 
does not require intervention from other states. The right of in-
tercourse and the rigbt to mutua1 respect show the fundamenta1 
status of a state when it maintains its re1ations with other states 
on an equa1 footing. The right of se1f-preservation a1so shows， on 
one hand， that the nationa1 life is comp1ete in itse1f， and on the 
other， the fundamenta1 status of a state when it maintains its re1-
ations with otber states. Al1 the above“mentioned fundamenta1 
rights prove that the state is a place of life apparentlycomplete' 
in itself for a certain group' of people; that it is a possessor of 
the supreme wilJ， or sovereignty. 1n this sense， these fundamental 
rights are the expression of the sovereign nature of the state. 
Since the state is a sovereign being， a1 the states are equal and 
can mutual1y assert. the equality. The international law stipulates 
this as the right of equality-the right by which a state can assert 
its eq1.ality with other states. 
1t must be admitted then that states， before entering into in司
ternational relations， laid down the international law by which they 
could mutually assert their status， and then made other international 
laws necessary for their匂mutual.rela.tions. For 'instance， from the 
intercourse between states and from their mutual respect derive 
the international law concerning the diplomatic privilege{3. the 'Ye-
spect to the head and other representatives of the state，and the 
method of expressing the national wi1 by the organ representirig 
the state and its e日ect. The existing internatinnal'law concerning 
the conc1usion of internationa1 treaties， for instance; is considered 
to have its basis upon the above-mentioned norm of mutually re-
cognizing the nationa1 status. 
The internatio 
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stateand otber international laws made by the states acting under 
tbe五rst-mentionedlaw came into being from tbe necessity of states 
to carry on tbeir iriternational community life; but tbese laws， Once 
established， set certain lirnits to the actions of states， wben seen 
frorn the viewpoint of such laws.， This is of course frorn the view-
point of those laws， aud it is needless to say that they are closely 
related to tbe will of拍osestutes which 0 hserve . thern. 1n otber 
words， al laws are closely related to thewill of the wi1-exercising 
bodies wbich have enacted them and act according to thern， and 
yet tbey appear to be independent of the wi1l-exercising bodies. 
This is one of tbe cbaracteristics of laws. International laws are 
no exception. Therefore， the laws， once stablisbed out of the corn-
rnon necessity of states and according to their comrnon will， give 
tbereafter certain e託ectsupon the relations of those states or give 
certain status to those states. 1n tbis respect， international laws 
have superiority over tbe state. Tbis， bowever， does not mean 
tbat they are the laws enacted by a wil1 superior to that of tbe 
state， but it rneans that they exist by the cornrnon wi1l of ，states 
and yet， once estaolisbed， they give certain e百ectsupon the acts 
of states because of their nature as laws. Here lies a characteristic 
of the direct relationship between the the state and tbe international 
law. 
